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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










NEW JERSEY RACING COMMISSION; SANTO LALOMIA, 
INDIVIDUALLY AND OFFICIALLY AS A MEMBER OF THE 
NEW JERSEY RACING COMMISSION; OLIVER R. 
KOVACS, INDIVIDUALLY AND OFFICIALLY AS A 
MEMBER OF THE NEW JERSEY RACING COMMISSION; 
STUART O. GOLDSMITH, INDIVIDUALLY AND 
OFFICIALLY AS A MEMBER OF THE NEW JERSEY 
RACING COMMISSION; WILLIAM E. MCGLYNN, 
INDIVIDUALLY AND OFFICIALLY AS A MEMBER OF THE 
NEW JERSEY RACING COMMISSION; DANIEL A. 
MONACO, DR., INDIVIDUALLY AND OFFICIALLY AS A 
MEMBER OF THE NEW JERSEY RACING COMMISSION; 
FRANK ORECHIO, INDIVIDUALLY AND OFFICIALLY AS A 
MEMBER OF THE NEW JERSEY RACING COMMISSION; 
SAVINO J. RUSSONIELLO, JR., INDIVIDUALLY AND 
OFFICIALLY AS A MEMBER OF THE NEW JERSEY 
RACING COMMISSION; SAMUEL M. CANNELLA, 
INDIVIDUALLY AND OFFICIALLY AS A MEMBER OF THE 
NEW JERSEY RACING COMMISSION; PETER J. 
COFRANCESCO, JR., INDIVIDUALLY AND OFFICIALLY AS 
A MEMBER OF THE NEW JERSEY RACING 
COMMISSION; FRANCESCO ZANZUCCKI, INDIVIDUALLY 
AND AS DIRECTOR OF THE NEW JERSEY RACING 
COMMISSION; MICHAEL VUKCEVICH, INDIVIDUALLY 
AND AS DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE NEW JERSEY 
STATE RACING COMMISSION, 
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Appeal is from a grant of summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant, New Jersey Racing Commission 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge, United States Court of 
International Trade, sitting by designation. 
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("Commission") and various of its employees. Appellant 
challenges his non-reappointment as a racing judge 
following his criticism of Commission executives' actions in 
connection with penalty adjudication and his public 
testimony about the same. He alleges violation of his 
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, his First 
Amendment free speech rights, and the New Jersey 
Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 34:19-1 et seq. (West 1996).1 We review the summary 
judgment record in the light most favorable to the 
appellant, the non-moving party. We will affirm as to the 
Fourteenth Amendment causes of action, but will reverse 
and remand for fact-finding as to the First Amendment 




Defendant New Jersey Racing Commission is a body 
created by N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:5-22 (West 1996) with 
jurisdiction, powers and duties overseeing horse racing 
conducted in the State of New Jersey. Defendant Francesco 
Zanzuccki is the Executive Director of the New Jersey 
Racing Commission, and defendant Michael Vukcevich is 
the Deputy Director of the New Jersey Racing Commission. 
 
In 1985, Mr. Latessa was licensed by the United States 
Trotting Association as an Associate Judge with powers to 
officiate as a judge at harness horse meets. In the latter 
part of 1985, he began working at various race tracks in 
New Jersey as either a Patrol Judge or an Associate Judge. 
Mr. Latessa was first appointed by the Commission as 
Presiding Judge at Garden State Park in 1988 and was also 
appointed to that position at the Meadowlands Race Track 
("The Meadowlands") in 1992. 
 
In New Jersey, racing judges are appointed on a meet-by- 
meet basis. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:5-37(a) (West 1996). They 
are paid on a weekly basis and do not receive fringe 
benefits. See id. They serve at the pleasure of the 
Commission. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:5-37(a). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. To the extent Latessa pursues a common law wrongful discharge claim 
on appeal, Latessa may not pursue that claim on remand because he 
failed to raise it before the district court in the first instance. 
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Penalty decisions are made in the first instance by 
certain officials employed by the Commission, including 
panels of judges. N.J. Admin. Code tit. 13, § 71-1.20(b) 
(1990). The Commission itself may modify a penalty 
decision. Id. § 71-1.23. Thereafter, appeal may be filed with 
the Commission, but the Commission may reject or modify 
on its own motion any imposed penalty or decision. Id. 
§ 71-3.3 (1995). Sometime in early 1993, Mr. Zanzuccki 
and Mr. Vukcevich began making penalty 
"recommendations" in horse drugging cases prior to the 
formal action of the three judge panel authorized to take 
initial action in such matters. 
 
In July of 1993, Mr. Zanzuccki told Mr. Latessa that a 
120-day penalty should be imposed on Thomas Milici, a 
horse trainer accused of administering an illegal drug, by 
the panel of judges which included Mr. Latessa. Mr. 
Latessa did not demur, but rather advised the panel of Mr. 
Zanzuccki's statement. The other judges disagreed, 
believing that the penalty would be inconsistent with 
penalties imposed in like circumstances previously and 
imposed a 90-day sentence. Mr. Latessa did not register a 
contrary vote. 
 
Mr. Zanzuccki was not pleased with the outcome of the 
Milici matter and demanded reports from the three judges 
as to what had occurred. The other two judges did not 
discuss what had occurred procedurally, but reported on 
the substance of their reasoning. Mr Latessa described 
similar reasoning, but also indicated that while he had 
advocated Mr. Zanzuccki's preferred penalty, he had been 
outvoted. Follow-up questioning of the other judges 
indicated to Mr. Zanzuccki that Mr. Latessa's "advocacy" 
did not go beyond reporting Mr. Zanzuccki's statement and 
that Mr. Latessa registered no formal dissenting vote. 
 
During the summer of 1993, Mr. Zanzuccki continued to 
either recommend or direct drug violation penalties prior to 
the completion of proceedings before the panel of racing 
judges. It was in connection with one of these cases that 
Mr. Latessa later gave testimony before the Office of 
Administrative Law about the early intervention of Mr. 
Zanzuccki in the proceedings. 
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At the end of the summer Mr. Latessa was reappointed 
as the Presiding Judge for the upcoming harness racing 
meet at Garden State Park. During the early fall Mr. 
Latessa, Mr. Vukcevich, and Mr. Zanzuccki continued to 
disagree about the manner in which the Milici matter was 
handled. In the first week of November, during a racing 
meet in California, Santo Lalomia, Chairman of the New 
Jersey Racing Commission, interviewed Michael Corley for 
the position of Presiding Judge. On November 16, 1993, Mr. 
Zanzuccki requested a meeting with Mr. Latessa scheduled 
for November 30, 1993. On November 19, 1993, Mr. 
Vukcevich sent Mr. Latessa a memorandum noting the 
"inconsistent" accounts of the Milici deliberations, as well 
as other points of disagreement. On November 22, 1993, 
Mr. Latessa testified before the Office of Administrative Law 
and one day later Mr. Zanzuccki sent a memorandum to 
Mr. Lalomia indicating he had decided not to reappoint Mr. 
Latessa. The administrative law judge credited Mr. 
Latessa's testimony and issued an opinion on November 29, 
1993, critical of the actions of Mr. Zanzuccki and his 
deputy. The administrative law judge said in part: 
 
The impartiality of the agency head - the NJRC - will 
be compromised if the Executive Director and/or 
Deputy Director participate in any advisory capacity 
concerning the penalty issue. The Executive Director 
and Deputy Director have already instructed the judges 
to impose a two-year suspension. The Deputy Director 
and Executive Director have in the past discussed 
penalty with the NJRC after an ALJ issued a decision, 
thereby making the proceedings before the OAL seem 
rather superfluous. "The primary reason for 
establishing the [OAL] was `to bring impartiality and 
objectivity to agency hearings and ultimately to achieve 
higher levels of fairness in administrative 
adjudications.' " In re Uniform Administrative Procedure 
Rules, 90 N.J. 85, 90 (1982) (citation omitted); . . . 
 
 While an administrative agency has the ultimate 
authority to adopt, reject or modify an ALJ's 
recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
"the agency head must base the final decision solely on 
the record established at the hearing." Matter of 
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Opinion No. 583, supra, 107 N.J. at 238. Thus, if the 
NJRC considers "other" information from the Executive 
Director and Deputy Director, the very individuals who 
proposed the penalty in this case, then the NJRC, as 
the final authority, would be admitting new evidence 
that neither the opposing party nor this ALJ had the 
opportunity to consider. Such actions, if permitted, 
would undermine the very purpose of the OAL 
proceeding. On a lesser scale of importance, but 
significant, and equally troubling, is the apparent 
blending of functions that seems to be common 
practice at the NJRC. Presiding Judge Latessa plainly 
acknowledged that he did not feel that the judges could 
do anything but follow the penalty proposed. From his 
testimony, a licensee, like Rubin, must question how 
impartial is such a hearing and, even assuming that 
there is nothing wrong with this practice, which seems 
to be at odds with basic due process notions, there is 
an [sic] least an appearance of impropriety. Such 
practices place individuals of high integrity, like 
Latessa and Gallagher, who essentially serve at the 
pleasure of the NJRC, in a difficult and possibly a 
compromising position. The potential for abuse is 
present and carried to its logical extreme, could result 
in the dismissal of a conscientious judge or steward. 
 
App. at 195-96 (emphasis in original). 
 
On December 3, 1993, Mr. Corley was recommended as 
the replacement for Mr. Latessa at the 1994 Meadowlands 






Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 we have jurisdiction to 
decide this appeal from a final decision of the district court. 
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
as plaintiff brought claims under 42 U.S.C. SS 1981, 1983, 
1985 and 1988.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The district court's dismissal of appellants' claim under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1985(2) is not the subject of the appeal. The district court indicated 
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As this matter comes to us following a grant of summary 
judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 in favor of defendants on 
all claims, review is plenary. Jefferson Bank v. Progressive 
Cas. Ins. Co., 965 F.2d 1274, 1278 (3d Cir. 1992). We also 
address whether the district court abused its discretion in 
denying leave to amend the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
15(a) to add new state law claims. Douglas v. Owens, 50 
F.3d 1226, 1235 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
Mr. Latessa alleges three causes of action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 based on deprivation of federal constitutional 
rights. First, he alleges violation of his Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights stemming from his liberty 
interest in remaining free to work as a racing judge. 
Second, he alleges violation of his Fourteenth Amendment 
due process rights stemming from his property interest in 
his position as Presiding Judge for the New Jersey Racing 
Commission. Third, he alleges violation of his free speech 
rights under the First Amendment. We will address these 




Mr. Latessa alleges violation of his Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights stemming from his liberty 
interest in remaining free to work as a racing judge. The 
liberty interest at issue is the right to "pursue a calling or 
occupation, and not the right to a specific job." Piecknick v. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1259 (3d 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
that no claim existed under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and plaintiff presented no 
arguments on appeal indicating he has such a claim. Thus, we affirm 
dismissal of the action as to that section. The district court also 
indicated that the parties were in agreement that the Eleventh 
Amendment requires dismissal of the federal causes of action against the 
state agency defendant. While claims based on statutes implementing 
the Fourteenth Amendment are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment 
if the intent to abrogate state immunities is clear, see Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 n.15 (1996), here, the parties 
agreed that the Commission is a state agency and not a "person" for 
purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Waiver of immunity for the state law claims was 
not addressed. 
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Cir. 1994) (quoting Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 
F.2d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
 
We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment 
against Mr. Latessa as "there is no issue for trial unless 
there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for 
a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Mr. Latessa 
failed to present any support for his contention that due to 
his non-reappointment he was effectively banned from all 
work in his occupation as a racing judge. In response to the 
motion for summary judgment he offered neither affidavits 
nor evidence of unsuccessful attempts to secure such 
employment following the non-reappointment at The  
Meadowlands.3 Mr. Latessa worked at tracks other than 
The Meadowlands and he did not attempt to establish that 
employment at other venues was not reasonably available 
to him. Moreover, Mr. Latessa offers no support for the 
proposition that he was unreasonably restricted in his 
ability to pursue his chosen occupation. Thus, the district 
court appropriately granted defendants' summary judgment 
on Mr. Latessa's claim of deprivation of a liberty interest 





In order to succeed on a claim of deprivation of due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to 
termination of a specific employment position, a plaintiff 
must first establish a property interest in the employment. 
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 
576 (1972). To have a property interest in a job or job 
benefit, an employee must have a legitimate claim of 
entitlement, not just a unilateral expectation. Id. at 577. 
Mr. Latessa lacked a legitimate claim of entitlement to his 
position. The parties do not dispute that New Jersey racing 
judges are appointed on a meet-by-meet basis, paid on a 
weekly basis, and receive no fringe benefits. Moreover, they 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Following the non-reappointment, he did work as a racing judge in 
Maryland for a short time, but he found it unacceptable for geographical 
reasons. 
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serve at the pleasure of the New Jersey Racing 
Commission. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:5-37(a). Thus, if only 
the statute were at issue, we would conclude that Mr. 
Latessa was an at-will employee without a property interest 
in his employment as a racing judge.4 
 
Property interests in employment may also arise, 
however, from " `mutually explicit understandings' between 
a government employer and employee." Stana v. School Dist. 
of City of Pittsburgh, 775 F.2d 122, 126 (3d Cir. 1985). Mr. 
Latessa asserts there is a triable issue of fact as to the 
existence of a property interest based on such 
understandings. He points to the deposition of Santo 
Lalomia, a defendant and Chairman of the New Jersey 
Racing Commission in support. In his deposition, Mr. 
Lalomia indicated that there was little turnover in the 
racing judge appointments, and "generally speaking" if one 
"keeps his nose clean" and lives up to expectations, 
employment would continue. This generalized statement is 
insufficient to create a position requiring just cause as a 
prerequisite for involuntary termination. 
 
Mr. Latessa suggests the mutual understanding 
described by Mr. Lalomia's deposition testimony is similar 
to the understanding documented in Perry v. Sindermann, 
408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).5 Perry, however, is 
distinguishable. In that case, plaintiff alleged a de facto 
tenure program for college professors "secured by `existing 
rules or understandings.' " Id. (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). 
The plaintiff alleged that the mutual understanding of 
continued employment was documented in the employer's 
official faculty guide which stated a faculty member "has 
permanent tenure as long as his teaching services are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We assume for the sake of argument that the legislature has not 
barred the Commission from granting employment rights of the type 
claimed here. 
 
5. The Supreme Court in Perry did not hold that the plaintiff had a 
legitimate claim of entitlement to job tenure. Id. at 602. Instead, it found 
that the plaintiff had alleged the existence of rules and understandings 
that "may justify his legitimate claim of entitlement to continued 
employment absent `sufficient cause' " and remanded to the district court 
to make such a determination. Id. at 602-03. 
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satisfactory . . . ." Id. at 600. Moreover, plaintiff relied upon 
Guidelines promulgated by the Coordinating Board of the 
Texas College and University System which stated if 
employed for seven years, the employee has some form of 
job tenure. Id. Mr. Latessa, however, has pointed to no 
evidence of such rules or understandings as to racing 
judges. The very generalized testimony cited does not reflect 
a specific bilateral understanding that particular cause 
must be shown before non-reappointment may occur. Thus, 
the district court correctly granted summary judgment to 
defendants on the basis of no triable issues of fact as to the 





Unlike Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, 
appellant's First Amendment right to be free from 
retaliation for speech is not defeated by the lack of a 
property or liberty interest in his employment. Id. at 599. A 
public employee's claim of retaliation for a protected 
activity, here speech, is analyzed in three steps. Green v. 
Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 885 (3d Cir. 1997); 
Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1288 (3d Cir. 1996); 
Watters v. City of Philadelphia, 55 F.3d 886, 892 (3d Cir. 
1995). First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that his speech 
was protected. Green, 105 F.3d at 885. Second, the plaintiff 
must show that the speech was a motivating factor in the 
alleged retaliatory action. Id. Third, the defendant may 
defeat the plaintiff's claim by establishing that the adverse 
action would have been taken even in the absence of the 
protected speech. Id. 
 
The district court focused on Mr. Latessa's testimony of 
November 22, 1993 before the New Jersey Office of 
Administrative Law which indicated that Mr. Latessa did 
not feel free to disagree with the penalty recommendations 
of Mr. Zanzuccki. The court determined that the decision 
not to reappoint Mr. Latessa occurred prior to November 
22, 1993, and thus the testimony could not have been a 
motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory non- 
reappointment. 
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In denying defendants' prior motion to dismiss, the 
district court had found that Mr. Latessa raised issues 
potentially satisfying the first prong of the test. For speech 
by a government employee to be protected, it must be 
regarding a public concern, as opposed to employment 
matters unrelated to such concerns. See Connick v. Myers, 
461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983); Azzaro v. County of Allegheny, 
No. 95-3253, 1997 WL 170285 (3d Cir. Apr. 11, 1997). 
Furthermore, we held in Green that a public employee's 
truthful testimony before a government adjudicating or 
fact-finding body, whether pursuant to a subpoena or not, 
is a matter of public interest. 105 F.3d at 887. Thus, Mr. 
Latessa's testimony before the Office of Administrative Law 
is a matter of public concern. 
 
A balancing test exists to determine if such public 
concern speech by a government employee is protected. See 
Pickering v. Board of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, 
Will County, Illinois, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). The public 
interest favoring expression "must not be outweighed by 
any injury the speech could cause to the interest of the 
state as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the 
public services it performs through its employees." Watters, 
55 F.3d at 892. Under the test, the government must show 
that the public concern value of the speech was likely to be 
outweighed by the disruption. Id. at 896 (applying new test 
of Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994)). 
 
Appellees' position is that Mr. Latessa was fired for 
"lying" in conversation and memoranda between Mr. 
Latessa and Mr. Zanzuccki, not because Mr. Latessa's 
testimony critical of administrative procedures was likely to 
be disruptive. Thus, for purposes of this appeal, the public 
concern speech represented by the testimony is treated as 
protected speech and the issue of whether Mr. Latessa was 
not reappointed in retaliation for his testimony must be 
addressed. For the following reasons we find this issue 
cannot be resolved as a matter of law. 
 
First, although Mr. Latessa had previously complained 
internally about what he believed was Mr. Vukcevich's and 
Mr. Zanzuccki's unlawful interference in the initial stages of 
the penalty proceedings, his public testimony occurred one 
day before Mr. Zanzuccki's memorandum indicating Mr. 
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Latessa would not be recommended for reappointment. 
Second, even though Mr. Latessa's eventual replacement, 
Mr. Corley, was interviewed before the testimony, there is 
no indication that a decision to appoint him had been made 
before the testimony.6 
 
Moreover, a fact-finder reasonably might view the 
accusation of "lying" as mere pretext. See Waters v. 
Churchill, 511 U.S. at 677 (employer may not rely on 
unreasonable conclusion as to what was said as pretext for 
firing because of protected speech). Here, the "lie" was Mr. 
Latessa's statement representing his presentation of Mr. 
Zanzuccki's "recommendation" to the panel of judges in the 
Milici matter as "advocacy." The "lie" may also have 
included his characterization of his action in the Milici 
matter as either a vote, a lack of a vote or the Commission's 
vote. While a trier of fact might conclude Mr. Latessa was 
fired because he was reasonably perceived to be lying, 
based on the evidence a trier of fact might also conclude 
otherwise. Given the fluidity of the panel deliberations, 
there may have been no "lie" in the sense of a knowingly 
false statement, and a trier of fact might conclude that Mr. 
Zanzuccki perceived just that and fired Mr. Latessa for the 
protected speech before the Office of Administrative Law. In 
view of the content of Mr. Latessa's speech, its temporal 
relation to the first indication in the record of a decision not 
to reappoint, and because a fact finder might reasonably 
reject as pretext the "lie" explanation for non- 
reappointment, a fact finder might also reasonably 
conclude that the testimony was the final straw, and hence 
a motivating factor for the failure to reappoint. 
 
In summary, as we view the current record, Mr. Latessa 
has marshaled substantial evidence tending to support the 
proposition that his testimony, rather than any lack of 
personal integrity in connection with the Milici matter, 
caused his non-renewal. First, Mr. Latessa had served for 
many years as a judge without challenge to his integrity. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The prior scheduling of a meeting between Mr. Zanzuccki and Mr. 
Latessa for November 30, 1993 is not determinative, because the record 
does not reveal what the purpose of the meeting was at the time of 
scheduling. 
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Second, Mr. Latessa's letters of July 13 and July 21, which 
are said by appellee to have demonstrated Mr. Latessa's 
lack of personal integrity in the Milici matter, are at best 
ambiguous and could be found by a reasonable trier of fact 
to be entirely consistent with his being qualified to serve as 
a judge. Third, Mr. Latessa was reappointed as the 
Presiding Judge for the fall meet on August 23, 1993, more 
than a month after he is said to have demonstrated this 
lack of personal integrity. Fourth, prior to his testimony 
before the Administrative Law Judge on November 22, 
1993, there is no documentation of a decision having been 
made by anyone not to renew Mr. Latessa. Fifth, Mr. 
Latessa's testimony before the Administrative Law Judge 
could be regarded by a trier of fact as very embarrassing to 
Zanzuccki, Vukcevich and the Commission. And, finally, on 
November 23, 1993, the day after this potentially 
embarrassing testimony was given, Zanzuccki wrote a letter 
to the Chairman of the Commission advising him that he 
intended to notify Latessa on November 30 that he would 
not be renewed. This letter is significant not only because 
it is the first documentation of a decision by anyone not to 
renew, but also because it reveals that Zanzuccki was then 
lobbying for the support of the Chairman and did not 
regard the non-renewal decision to be a fait accompli. 
 
Accordingly, we will remand to the district court because 
the second prong of the three-step analysis requires a 
factual determination as to whether Mr. Latessa's November 
22, 1993 testimony was a motivating factor in the decision 
not to reappoint him as a Presiding Judge. 
 
Furthermore, the district court appears to have ruled 
alternatively that even if the protected conduct was a 
motivating factor in Latessa's reappointment, for 
independent reasons he would not have been reappointed. 
See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 
U.S. 274, 285 (1977). If viewed in the light most favorable 
to plaintiff, the facts discussed previously do not permit 




It is unclear from the presentation of this case as to 
whether Mr. Latessa alleges his "vote" in the Milici matter 
 
                                13 
was protected speech and was part of the motivation for the 
non-reappointment. Mr. Latessa does allege that his right 
to vote freely in other cases was chilled by Mr. Zanzuccki's 
actions following the Milici matter. Numerous employment 
actions directed by an employer involve the medium of 
speech. All such actions do not become protected simply 
because some expression is involved. See Connick v. 
Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 ("Government offices could not 
function if every employment decision became a 
constitutional matter."). While Mr. Latessa's public 
statements about the procedures affecting voting may be of 
public concern and hence protectable, his generalized 
allegation that he could not vote as he wished does not 
support a claim based on the First Amendment. The vote in 
any particular case was not improper compelled expression 
on a political or ideological matter. See, e.g., West Virginia 
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) 
(compulsion to salute flag and recite the pledge of 
allegiance invalid as "no official . . . can prescribe what 
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or 
act their faith therein"). Nor was any particular penalty vote 
otherwise relevant to a self-governing society's ability to 
self-govern. See Azzaro, 1997 WL 170285, at *10. Mr. 
Latessa's complaints involved the procedure employed and 
it is his expression about such procedure that is of public 
concern. 
 
Of more substance is Mr. Latessa's argument that he was 
discharged because of his ongoing internal objections to 
Mr. Zanzuccki's and Mr. Vukcevich's interference in initial 
penalty decision-making. Internal expression may also be 
protected. Id. ("Private dissemination of information and 
ideas can be as important to effective self-governance as 
public speeches."). Such claims must be analyzed under 
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). In that case an 
assistant district attorney who was protesting transfer 
circulated an office questionnaire relating to internal office 
matters not of public concern and also relating tangentially 
to a matter of public concern, specifically, pressure to work 
in political campaigns. The question once more is to what 
degree the internal speech touches upon matters of public 
concern and to what degree effective functioning of the 
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governmental office is likely to be disrupted by the speech. 
See id. at 150. The Commission's burden in justifying its 
action "varies depending on the nature of the employee's 
expression." See id. For the following reasons, we remand 
this issue to the district court to apply the three step 
procedure set forth in Pickering and Connick, as modified by 
Waters. 
 
First, appellees have not asserted directly any likely 
disruption to governmental functions as they continue to 
allege only that Mr. Latessa was fired for lying. See Connick, 
461 U.S. at 150. Second, the balance in the internal 
complaints between nonpublic and public concerns is 
unclear. Mr. Vukcevich's memorandum of November 19, 
1993, does reveal that Mr. Latessa was understood to be 
complaining about the intervention in initial penalty 
decision-making, as well as other matters of both public 
and personal concern. Third, the district court did not 
address whether the public concern portion of this internal 
speech, rather than the testimony only, was a motivating 
factor in the non-reappointment. Finally, although the 
district court concluded that early Commission intervention 
was not illegal, the New Jersey law is ambiguous. One 
could reasonably argue, as the administrative law judge 
noted upon hearing Mr. Latessa's testimony, that if the 
Commission decides from the outset what penalties should 
be imposed there is no point to a multi-layered adjudicatory 
system. In any case, the wisdom of the early intervention is 
a matter of public concern, even if it is not prohibited 
under current New Jersey law. Because Mr. Latessa's 
internal complaints about administrative procedures touch 
upon matters of public concern rather the issue of 
retaliatory action for internal speech must be remanded. 
 
Mr. Latessa's state law claim was also dismissed because 
he did not establish that protected speech was a motivating 
factor in his nonreappointment. Thus, this claim will also 
be remanded. Because denial of plaintiff's motion to amend 
to add other state law claims apparently was based on the 
district court's dismissal of all federal claims, this issue will 
be remanded as well.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The district court did not state its reason expressly. 
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MANSMANN, Circuit Judge, concurring in the result in part 
and dissenting in part. 
 
I agree with the majority that the district court properly 
granted the Commission's motion for summary judgment as 
to Latessa's Fourteenth Amendment claims. I also believe, 
however, that the district court was correct when it granted 
the Commission's motion as to Latessa's First Amendment 
claim. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the district 




My disagreement with the majority stems from the 
policies and procedures of the Commission, and from the 
facts surrounding the Milici incident and Latessa's 
testimony. I therefore set forth my understanding of the 
undisputed facts at some length. 
 
The Commission is a regulatory body responsible for 
overseeing all horse racing conducted in New Jersey. Horse 
racing occurs at three facilities in New Jersey, and each 
facility operates one "meeting" per year. Prior to each 
meeting, the Commission appoints a panel of one presiding 
judge and two associate judges to officiate and monitor 
horse races, review the conduct of race participants, and 
review the medical status of the horses. If it appears that 
an infraction has occurred, the judges conduct a hearing to 
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. If an 
infraction is found, the judges are empowered to impose a 
penalty. While the judges impose penalties "in the first 
instance," N.J. Admin. Code tit. 13, § 71-1.20(b), the 
Commission is free to disregard the judges' decision and 
may impose a penalty of its choosing. Id. § 71-1.23. 
 
The Commission appoints the judges on a meet-by-meet 
basis, and they serve "at the pleasure of the commission." 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:5-37(a). At the conclusion of each meet, 
the judges are ordinarily (but not always) reappointed for 
the next meet. In 1985, the Commission appointed Latessa 
as an associate judge. For the next several years, the 
Commission regularly reappointed Latessa, eventually 
appointing him as the presiding judge. 
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In May 1993, two horses tested positive for prohibited 
drugs. After the trainers were found guilty of administering 
the drugs, but prior to the imposition of penalties, 
Francesco Zanzuccki, the Executive Director of the 
Commission, contacted Latessa. Zanzuccki told Latessa to 
impose a 120-day suspension on trainer Milici and a 90- 
day suspension on trainer Riegle. Latessa relayed 
Zanzuccki's recommendations to the other two judges on 
the panel, but the judges voted unanimously to impose a 
90-day suspension on both trainers. 
 
When Zanzuccki learned about the suspensions, he 
contacted Latessa to inquire about the deliberations. 
Latessa responded that he advocated the 120-day 
suspension for Milici but that he was outvoted two to one. 
Zanzuccki then contacted the two associate judges. Those 
judges did not state that Latessa had advocated or voted for 
the 120-day suspension, but stated that Latessa merely 
told them about the recommendation. 
 
In a subsequent letter to Zanzuccki, Latessa stated that 
"[t]he vote was 2 to 1, to make it unanimous, I concurred." 
In a subsequent letter, however, Latessa stated that the "2 
to 1" vote meant "2 associate votes to the 1 commission 
vote." In the second letter, Latessa added that he had 
always supported a 90-day suspension for Milici. 
 
In his deposition, Zanzuccki testified that he believed 
that Latessa would advocate in favor of a 120-day 
suspension for Milici and that he was disturbed when he 
discovered that Latessa did not do so. Zanzuccki was also 
bothered by the fact that Latessa stated that he changed 
his vote to establish unanimity, when the purpose of a 
three-judge panel is to allow dissenting views. In addition, 
Zanzuccki was upset that Latessa originally stated that he 
voted for a 120-day suspension, but that he later stated 
that he always supported a 90-day suspension and that the 
"1" in the "2 to 1" vote represented a Commission vote. 
Finally, Zanzuccki believed that Latessa's statements about 
the deliberations and the vote were inconsistent with each 
other and with the statements of the associate judges. 
 
Zanzuccki testified that the Commission decided not to 
reappoint Latessa in the early fall of 1993, and Latessa 
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does not offer any evidence to the contrary. On October 7, 
1993, the Commission received a letter from Michael Corley 
expressing interest in the presiding judge position. In the 
first week of November, Commission Chairman Santo 
Lalomia interviewed Corley for the position. 
 
By letter dated November 16, Zanzuccki requested that 
Latessa meet with Zanzuccki on November 30, 1993. 
Zanzuccki testified that he scheduled the meeting to inform 
Latessa about the Commission's decision not to reappoint 
him for another meet. Zanzuccki explained that the meeting 
was not scheduled until November 30 because Latessa was 
serving as presiding judge when the meeting was scheduled 
and it would have been difficult to replace him on short 
notice. Latessa does not offer any evidence to the contrary. 
 
On November 22, 1993, Latessa was called to testify at a 
hearing in the Office of Administrative Law in the case of 
Jordan Rubin, a trainer suspended by Latessa's panel for 
two years. When asked about the severe penalty, Latessa 
testified that the decision to impose a two-year penalty was 
made at the direction of the Commission. When asked if he 
felt free to impose a different penalty, Latessa said "No." 
 
On November 23, 1993, Zanzuccki sent Lalomia a 
confidential memorandum stating that he intended to notify 
Latessa on November 30 that he would not be offered 
employment with the Commission in 1994. Zanzuccki 
stated that the memorandum contained several 
attachments that demonstrate "the type of problems" that 
led Zanzuccki to decide not to offer Latessa employment for 
the upcoming year. The memorandum specifically refers to 
"the untruthfulness of [Latessa]." The memorandum does 
not mention Latessa's November 22 testimony before the 
OAL. 
 
On November 30, 1993, Zanzuccki advised Latessa that 
Latessa would not be offered employment with the 
Commission in 1994. In December 1993, the Commission 




I agree with the majority that the district court properly 
dismissed Latessa's Fourteenth Amendment liberty claim. 
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Latessa has failed to demonstrate that he was deprived of 
a liberty interest sufficient to enable him to invoke 
procedural due process protection. While the Constitution 
may recognize a liberty interest in employment, the 
Constitution only protects that interest from state actions 
that threaten to deprive persons of the right to pursue their 
chosen occupation. Piecknick v. Commonwealth of Pa., 36 
F.3d 1250, 1259-60 (3d Cir. 1994). State actions that 
exclude a person from one particular job are not actionable 
in suits brought directly under the due process clause. Id. 
"It stretches the concept too far to suggest that a person is 
deprived of `liberty' when he simply is not rehired in one job 
but remains as free as before to seek another." Board of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 (1972). 
 
Latessa never applied for a position with the Commission 
after he was not reappointed. In addition, Latessa worked 
as a racing judge in Maryland subsequent to not being 
reappointed in New Jersey. Latessa decided not to remain 
in Maryland, however, and he rejected other potential job 
offers as well. Thus, the Commission did not deprive 
Latessa of the right to work in his chosen occupation; 
Latessa did. 
 
A plaintiff cannot assert a liberty interest where none 
exists merely by limiting his chosen occupation to the point 
where "occupation" becomes synonymous with "job." By 
unnecessarily limiting his "chosen occupation" to "presiding 
racing judge in New Jersey employed by the Commission," 
Latessa asks us to find a liberty interest in a job. We 
should not do so. 
 
Latessa's Fourteenth Amendment property interest 
argument is equally without merit. To succeed on this 
claim, Latessa must show that he has a property interest in 
the position of presiding judge. To have a property interest 
in a job, "a person clearly must have more than an abstract 
need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral 
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim 
of entitlement to it." Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; Carter v. City of 
Phila., 989 F.2d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 1993) ("One alleging a 
property interest in a benefit protected by due process must 
go beyond showing an unsubstantiated expectation of the 
benefit."). 
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A person's interest in a job is a "property" interest for due 
process purposes if there are "mutually explicit 
understandings" that support his claim of entitlement to 
the job. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972); 
Carter, 989 F.2d at 120. Unilateral expectations of a 
plaintiff are not sufficient to create a property interest. 
 
Latessa contends that there was a mutually explicit 
understanding between the Commission and the judges 
that absent just cause for non-reappointment, the judges 
would always be reappointed. By statute, however, Latessa 
is an at-will employee who is appointed on a meet-by-meet 
basis and who serves at the pleasure of the Commission. 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:5-37(a). While a statute can, in some 
cases, create a property interest in a job, the statute here 
expressly precludes such a property interest. Any property 
interest Latessa arguably may have had in his position 
lasted no longer than the length of one meet. To the extent 
that Latessa held an expectation of being continuously 
reappointed to the position of presiding judge, that 
expectation was unilateral and is not sufficient to support 




Latessa also alleged that the Commission failed to 
reappoint Latessa due to the exercise of Latessa's free 
speech rights. Latessa contends that he was not 
reappointed because on November 22, 1993, he testified 
about Zanzuccki's influence in the penalty phase of the 
judges' deliberations. 
 
As the majority recognizes, a public employee's claim of 
retaliation for engaging in a protected activity is analyzed 
under a three-step process. Green v. Philadelphia Hous. 
Auth., 105 F.2d 882, 885 (3d Cir. 1997). First, Latessa 
must show that the activity in question was protected. Id. 
If Latessa shows the activity was protected, he must then 
show that the activity was a motivating factor in the 
Commission's decision. Id. Finally, if he meets these 
burdens, the Commission has an opportunity to defeat his 
claim by demonstrating that it would have taken the same 
action even in the absence of the protected activity. Id. 
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Assuming that Latessa's testimony constituted protected 
activity, I agree with the district court that Latessa cannot 
show that the testimony was a motivating factor in his 
failure to be reappointed. The evidence of record 
demonstrates without contradiction that the Commission 
decided not to reappoint Latessa no later than early 
November--before Latessa testified. It is undisputed, for 
example, that the Commission interviewed Latessa's 
replacement prior to November 22, 1993. Zanzuccki 
testified without contradiction that prior to November 22, 
he decided not to reappoint Latessa, but that he decided to 
wait until November 30 to notify Latessa because of an 
ongoing meet. A letter dated November 16, 1993, confirms 
that prior to the testimony, Zanzuccki scheduled a meeting 
with Latessa. Latessa does not offer any evidence linking 
the reappointment decision to the November 22 testimony. 
 
In addition, the Commission has explained that it 
decided not to reappoint Latessa because Latessa failed to 
properly communicate to Zanzuccki his position on the 
penalty deliberations in the Milici case. The record supports 
the Commission's position that Latessa's communications 
regarding the Milici incident were inconsistent. Zanzuccki's 
November 23 letter confirms that Zanzuccki was concerned 
about Latessa's honesty, not about the November 22 
hearing. Latessa does not offer any evidence from which a 
finder of fact could determine that the Commission's 
reasons for failing to reappoint him were pretextual. 
 
Because I believe that Latessa cannot satisfy the second 
prong of our First Amendment analysis, I agree with the 
district court that the Commission was entitled to summary 
judgment on Latessa's First Amendment claim. The 
majority concludes, however, that the issue of whether 
Latessa was not reappointed in retaliation for his testimony 
cannot be resolved as a matter of law. The majority makes 
three arguments in support of its position. 
 
First, the majority observes that Latessa testified one day 
before Zanzuccki sent the memorandum indicating that 
Latessa should not be reappointed. While it is true that 
Latessa was not notified of his non-reappointment until 
shortly after his testimony before the OAL, uncontradicted 
evidence demonstrates that the decision not to reappoint 
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Latessa was made prior to the testimony. In addition, the 
memorandum at issue makes no mention of the testimony; 
instead, it explains that Zanzuccki was concerned about 
Latessa's honesty. There is no indication that the decision 
not to reappoint Latessa was made after the testimony. 
 
Even if the decision to not reappoint Latessa was made 
the day after Latessa testified, however, we have held that 
"timing alone will not suffice to prove retaliatory motive." 
Delli Santi v. CNA Ins. Cos., 88 F.3d 192, 199 n.10 (3d Cir. 
1996); see also Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 501 
(3d Cir. 1991). While timing may be used to establish a 
causal link between protected activity and a subsequent 
employment action, see Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 
708 (3d Cir. 1989), it may not, without more, establish 
retaliatory motive. 
 
Second, the majority observes that there is no evidence 
that the Commission decided to hire Corley prior to 
Latessa's testimony. This observation, while true, is not 
relevant. Even if we assume that the decision to hire Corley 
was made after Latessa's testimony (and the evidence in 
this regard is inconclusive), the decision to interview Corley 
was made weeks before the testimony. The timing of the 
interview demonstrates that the Commission desired to 
replace Latessa prior to the testimony. 
 
Finally, the majority asserts that a trier of fact "might" 
view Zanzuccki's explanation as mere pretext. As noted, 
Zanzuccki testified that he was concerned about Latessa's 
honesty. Given Latessa's inconsistent statements regarding 
the Milici matter, this concern was eminently reasonable. 
The majority reasons, however, that "there may have been 
no `lie' in the sense of a knowingly false statement, and a 
trier of fact might conclude that Mr. Zanzuccki perceived 
just that and fired Mr. Latessa for the protected speech 
before the Office of Administrative Law." Maj. Op., at 12. 
 
While I take issue with the majority's premise that there 
may not have been a "lie" (the record clearly establishes 
that Latessa made inconsistent statements about the Milici 
matter), I am more concerned about the majority's decision 
to permit a case to be tried on nothing more than 
speculation. In Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 
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100 F.3d 1061 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), we recognized that 
a plaintiff may survive summary judgment in a pretext case 
"if the plaintiff produce[s] sufficient evidence to raise a 
genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer's proffered 
reasons were not its true reasons for the challenged 
employment action." Id. at 1067 (emphasis supplied); see 
also id. at 1072 (plaintiff must introduce "evidence that 
undermines the employer's proffered reasons for its  
actions").1 
 
When faced with a motion for judgment as a matter of 
law, the court must determine "whether the plaintiff has 
cast sufficient doubt upon the employer's proffered reasons 
to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the 
reasons are incredible . . . ." Id. at 1072. In this case, 
Latessa has not offered any evidence whatsoever to support 
his claim that the Commission's explanation for its 
reappointment decision was a pretext for retaliation. The 
Commission's explanation for its decision was credible and 
remains unchallenged. The majority does not offer any 
evidence to support its conclusion that the trier of fact 
"might" view the Commission's explanation as a pretext for 
retaliation. 
 
Our precedent requires more than a mere possibility that 
a trier of fact might disbelieve an employer's explanation for 
its employment decision; it requires that the plaintiff offer 
some evidence that would support the trier of fact's disbelief.2 
This is ordinarily done by demonstrating "such weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. While Sheridan involved a retaliation claim brought under Title VII, the 
determination of whether First Amendment protected activity was a 
motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory action may follow Title VII 
pretext analysis. See, e.g., Azzaro v. County of Allegheny, No. 95-3253, 
1997 WL 170285, at *7, *14 (3d Cir. April 9, 1997) (en banc); Maj. Op., 
at 11-12. 
 
2. Cf. Azzaro v. County of Allegheny, No. 95-3253, 1997 WL 170285, at 
*7 (3d Cir. April 9, 1997) (en banc) (emphasis supplied) ("Azzaro tendered 
evidence from which it could be inferred that the reason given by Braun 
for her discharge was pretextual . . . ."); id. at *14 (emphasis supplied) 
("Based on the evidence . . . we also conclude that there is a material 
dispute of fact as to whether her reports were a motivating factor in the 
discharge decision.") 
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contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate 
reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could 
rationally find them `unworthy of credence.' " Fuentes v. 
Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 
F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir. 1993)). The Commission's 
explanation does not suffer from any of these defects. 
 
Under the majority's reasoning, if an employee who 
engages in protected activity subsequently suffers an 
adverse employment action, the employer cannot obtain 
summary judgment on the employee's retaliation claim so 
long as its explanation "might" be disbelieved--even if there 
is nothing to support such disbelief. Under our precedent, 
the plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate that the 
employer's explanation for its action is a pretext for 
retaliation. The majority turns this precedent on its head, 
requiring the employer to prove that its explanation is 
worthy of belief. 
 
I agree with the district court that Latessa failed to offer 
any evidence that would permit a trier of fact to disbelieve 
the Commission's explanation for its reappointment 
decision. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the 
district court dismissing Latessa's First Amendment claim.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. I would affirm the district court's grant of the Commission's motion for 
summary judgment on Latessa's claim for retaliation brought under the 
New Jersey "Conscientious Employee Protection Act," N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 34:19-1 et seq., for the same reason I would affirm the judgment of the 
district court in dismissing Latessa's First Amendment claim. CEPA was 
designed to prohibit retaliatory activity by an employer against an 
employee who discloses or threatens to disclose certain illegal or 
unethical workplace activity. Young v. Schering Corp., 645 A.2d 1238, 
1244 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1994) (citations omitted), aff'd, 660 A.2d 1153 
(N.J. 1995). To succeed on his CEPA claim, Latessa must show that he 
was not reappointed due to his testimony before the OAL. As discussed, 
I believe that nothing in the record would support such a finding. 
 
I would also affirm the district court's refusal to permit Latessa to 
amend his complaint to include claims under the "Discipline" Operating 
Procedures of the New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety as 
well as the whistleblower provisions of N.J. Admin. Code tit. 4A, § 2- 
5.1(a). The district court may decline to exercise supplemental 
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Accordingly, I respectfully dissent in part. 
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jurisdiction over a claim if the district court has dismissed all claims 
over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.§ 1367(c)(3); 
Pennsylvania Nurses Assoc. v. Pennsylvania State Educ. Assoc., 90 F.3d 
797, 801 (3d Cir. 1996). After properly dismissing every count of 
Latessa's complaint, the district court was under no obligation to accept 
jurisdiction over two new state-law claims. Given the majority's 
reinstatement of some of Latessa's federal law claims, however, I concur 
that the district court should now revisit these state law claims. 
 
Finally, I agree with the majority that Latessa's failure to pursue a 
common law wrongful discharge claim before the district court precludes 
him from pursuing such a claim on remand. Maj. Op., at 3 n.1. 
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